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ABSTRACT 
A multiregion applied general equilibrium model is used to examine the financial interactions among 
spheres of government in the context of fiscal consolidation. The framework combines nine regional 
submodels interacting through the trading of goods and services and the mobility of labor and capital. The 
model integrates intergovernmental fiscal transfers, which play an important role in reducing the disparity 
in living standards between regions. The analysis demonstrates that the current intergovernmental revenue 
transfer system has significant inter- and intraregional equity effects, although its nationwide impact is 
less important. Reducing intergovernmental transfers leads to a reduction in welfare in the four regions 
where the net transfers were initially positive (Limpopo, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and North West 
Province). In contrast, welfare increases in the five other regions (Northern Cape, Mpumalanga, Free 
State, Gauteng, and the Western Cape). When transfer revenues fall and, consequently, regional and local 
government revenues drop, poor households are the most affected, as they depend more on public 
services that are essentially financed by governments. When the government’s fiscal position improves, it 
is also poor households that benefit more from additional government expenses.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Many complex responses that arise from the interaction of the various spheres of government require 
appropriate techniques to effectively capture them. Applied general equilibrium (AGE) models are among 
the methods and tools used to better understand the interactions between national and subnational 
government spheres. These models are able to trace the changes in property prices, changes in 
opportunities for households, and migration between regions following reforms to arrangements of 
distributing available revenue. In addition they are able to shed light on the extent to which subnational 
government participates in fiscal consolidation and hence macroeconomic adjustment. 
Financial interactions between spheres of government and fiscal consolidation take on an added 
dimension of complexity in countries with multiple government spheres. Most of the literature on the 
relationship between different spheres of government and their interaction on the financial side has 
focused on the optimal assignment of public service provision and its financing between different levels 
of government.
1 The literature on macroeconomic management in multi-tiered governments, though less 
well developed, emphasizes that the increasing tendency toward decentralization and fiscal federalism 
raises the issue of how to maintain sustainable public finances. A key issue discussed concerns incentives 
faced by multi-tiered fiscal authorities, for example, the problem of soft budget constraints faced by 
subnational governments tasked with providing an essential service such as healthcare. This has led many 
countries to adopt fiscal coordination mechanisms to address the problem.
2  
This paper uses a multiregion AGE model to analyze the effects of government expenditures, 
taxation, and intergovernmental grants on equity and efficiency goals when used as an instrument of fiscal 
consolidation. The model is applied to South Africa, which is a unitary-state country with three spheres of 
government (local, provincial, and national) and a federal-like constitution. General government 
expenditure constitutes roughly 33 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The portion raised 
nationally is approximately 29 percent, while locally raised revenue is approximately 4 percent. 
Provincially raised revenue is insignificant and rarely constitutes more than 2 percent of provincial 
revenue. The global economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 has brought to the fore a mismatch between 
revenues and expenditures for the country. The consequent slowdown in economic activity has reduced 
tax revenues. With government expenditures rising as a countermeasure to the recession as well as for 
capitalization of public enterprises, the government budget balance has deteriorated from a surplus of 0.9 
percent of GDP in fiscal year 2008 to a projected deficit of 7.3 percent in fiscal year 2010. Gross loan 
debt is projected to reach 43.1 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2013, which is a significant rise from its level 
of 27 percent in 2009 (South Africa, National Treasury 2010). The outlook becomes even gloomier if 
sustainability indicators incorporate projected future events such as changes in the age structure of the 
population and the HIV/AIDS disease burden. Unless modified, current fiscal policy is thus likely to pass 
huge tax bills on to future generations. 
The government has already commenced fiscal consolidation efforts, realizing that deficits of this 
magnitude not only lead to large public debts that may themselves become unsustainable but can 
destabilize the economy through rising inflation and interest rates. In this regard, the 2010/11 budget 
provides for a 1 percentage point reduction in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal 
year 2013, a measure that can be viewed as a first direct signal of the government’s intent with regard to 
fiscal consolidation.  
With fiscal consolidation a high-priority policy issue in South Africa today, it becomes important 
to arrive at a better understanding of how the gains and losses from deficit reduction are distributed. The 
cut in grants to the regions necessary to effect the 1 percentage point reduction in the expenditure-to-GDP 
                                                      
1 This is the classical fiscal federalism literature. Studies have looked at how different levels of government react to changes 
in the balance between central government grants and local revenues, for example, the flypaper effect. See Oates (1999) for an 
extensive review of this literature.  
2 These range from formal subnational fiscal rules (for example, expenditure and borrowing ceilings) to informal 
coordination mechanisms.   
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ratio can be viewed as a series of events, rather than fiscal consolidation per se, which allows us to assess 
the extent to which subnational governments adjust expenditures and use their own fiscal powers (where 
these are significant) to offset the cuts in their grant allocations. 
The following section gives the structure and specificities of the multiregion AGE model used in 
this study. In the third section, we discuss the data requirements. The fourth section discusses the 
simulation and results, while the fifth section concludes the paper.  
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2.  THE MODEL 
This section reports the main features of the Integrated Multi-region Applied General Equilibrium 
(IMAGE) model built for South Africa and used to assess the equity and efficiency of the current South 
African intergovernmental revenue transfers (IGRT). The model combines nine submodels (Figure 2.1) 
that replicate the economies of the nine regions that constitute South Africa using an AGE framework.
3 
Figure 2.1—Schematic representation of the Integrated Multi-region Applied General Equilibrium 
(IMAGE) model  






































Rest of the world 
Source: Authors. 
Note: AGE = applied general equilibrium; IGRT = intergovernmental revenue transfers; RSA = rest of South Africa. 
An AGE model is a multimarket and multiagent system of equations that simulates the working 
of a market economy using real-world data. The use of AGE models in policy analysis permits the 
integration of both direct and indirect interactions throughout the economy; that is, if something changes 
in one part of the economy due to government policy, the model automatically computes the effects in the 
other parts. 
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The neoclassical general equilibrium theory is at the core of the IMAGE model, which seeks to 
explain production, consumption, and prices in an economy in which producers and consumers respond to 
relative prices as a result of profit-maximizing and utility-maximizing behaviors, respectively. Markets 
simultaneously adjust relative prices in order to reconcile supply and demand decisions, and thus 
determine levels of production and consumption. 
As noted by Partridge and Rickman (2010), although regional AGE models follow country model 
archetypes, they present some additional complexities, including the following: 
•  Regions trade not only with foreign countries, but also with other regions; therefore, the 
openness of the regional economy is greater than that of the country economy. 
•  Labor mobility is greater among regions of a country than among countries; furthermore, 
there is a mismatch between the place of factor employment and the place of expenditure of 
factor income. 
•  Regional saving is less likely to influence regional investment. 
•  The intergovernmental fiscal transfers play an important role in reducing the disparity in 
living standards between regions. 
The IMAGE model establishes the relationships among regions at four levels: (1) commodity 
trade, (2) factor mobility, (3) IGRT, and (4) private transfers. These relationships are discussed separately 
in the following sections. 
Commodity Trade 
Interregional trade is specified according to the information provided by the regional Social Accounting 
Matrixes (SAMs). Data on imported and exported commodities (and other interregional linking variables) 
are available in one aggregate account: the rest of South Africa (RSA). That is, the nine regional SAMs 
do not feature information on the region of origin and the region of destination for the traded products. 
The model presented here is shaped according to this information. 
The first difference between the standard country model and the regional model is the number of 
trading partners. Specifically, the IMAGE model features three trading partners instead of the two usually 
encountered by standard AGE models. The availability of a given product in one region, or absorption, is 
met by an aggregation of products from the region, from other South African regions, and from the rest of 
the world. A nested constant elasticity of substitution specifies an imperfect substitution relationship 
among demands from the three regions. The derivative demands of the product from the region r, the 
RSA, and the rest of the world are closely related to the price of the product in the region, the average 
price of the product from the RSA, and the converted world price of the imported product. 
As in standard AGE models, the region r prices of goods and services are determined through the 
neoclassical market-clearing price system (perfect competition hypothesis). That is, producers and 
consumers take as given the relative prices that equalize the quantities demanded and produced for each 
commodity. Therefore, simultaneously determined producer and consumer prices vary only by given tax 
or subsidy and margins rates. 
The treatment of world prices is also similar to that in the standard AGE framework. That is, 
fixed international prices of imported commodities are assumed, in other words, there is no constraint on 
the availability or the supply of foreign goods (small country hypothesis). However, the converted prices 
of foreign goods, which are defined by international fixed prices, the exchange rate, and government 
fiscal interventions, determine the allocation of demand between national and international products. 
The second feature of the IMAGE model is the interregional trade of goods and services and the 
treatment of export demand. In general, standard AGE models assume a fixed export demand for 
internationally traded commodities. However, an increasing number of models integrate a downward 
sloping export demand system that links export demand to the ratio of the fixed world price to the export 
free on board (f.o.b.) price. In the IMAGE model, the export demand addressed to a region is determined 
by the demand for imports from other regions of the country.  
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Interregional trade is governed by the following rule: for a given commodity, the nationwide 
export demand is equal to the aggregation of the nine regions’ imports (Figure 2.2). Then, the export 
demand addressed to a specific region follows a cost minimization rule. A constant elasticity of 
substitution is used to determine the export demand for the region from the nationwide export demand. 
Regional export prices determine the allocation of export demand among regions. Regional prices thus 
clear export supply and demand in the regions. Thus, the average price of imported commodities from the 
RSA is the average price of exported commodities by the RSA. The latter is the weighted average export 
price in all regions in South Africa. 
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Note: ROW = rest of world; RSA = rest of South Africa  
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An imperfect transformation among the regional market, the RSA market, and the international 
market is specified for regional production. Therefore, export supplies of a product to the region, the 
RSA, and the rest of the world are closely linked to the price of the product in the region, the average 
price of the product from the RSA, and the f.o.b. price of the internationally exported product. 
Adjustments in export f.o.b. prices balance export demand from and export supply to the rest of 
the world. Export demand from the rest of the world follows the standard specification, that is, it is 
downward sloping. Consequently, export demand depends on world prices and domestic f.o.b. prices. 
Factor Mobility 
An adaption of the Harris and Todaro (1970) model of migration is used to explain the interregional 
mobility of factors, that is, labor and capital. The Harris and Todaro model assumes that the migration 
decision is based on the differentials between the expected wage in the urban sector and the wage rate in 
the rural sector. This implies that as long as the expected wage from migrating to the urban area is greater 
than the wage in the rural area, rural–urban migration occurs. 
The IMAGE model considers a natural interregional flow of labor and capital explained by many 
factors, including the price differentials between regions. We assume that the relative changes in labor or 
capital flows (compared to their initial levels given by the regional SAMs) are closely linked to the 
changes in the ratio of national to regional prices. When the ratio is greater than 1, there is an increase in 
the flow of labor or capital from the region toward the rest of the country. 
The interregional reallocation of factors is made in two steps (Figure 2.3): first the decision to 
move is made, and then the choice about the destination. In this relationship, it is assumed that potential 
migrants or capital holders are risk averse. The assumption is modeled by an inelastic relationship 
between the changes in interregional labor or capital flows with respect to changes in the expected wage 
or return-to-capital ratio. The migrant laborers spend their entire revenue in the region of origin.
4 
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Note: ROW = rest of world; RSA = rest of South Africa. 
   
                                                      
4 Alternatively, we could assume that migrant revenue is shared between the region of origin and the region of destination 
by defining a sharing formula.  
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Labor 
The change in labor supply to the RSA compared to its initial level depends on the ratio of the expected 
wage rate in the region and the nationwide average expected wage rate. The expected wage rates are equal 
to the gross wage rates adjusted by the unemployment rates. The nationwide average wage and 
unemployment rates are equal to the regional wage rates weighted by the regional supply and demand of 
labor, respectively. 
The total supply of labor to the RSA is an aggregate of the regional supplies (see Figure 2.3). It is 
then distributed among regions according to an imperfect transformation relationship. The supply of labor 
from the RSA to one region is closely related to the ratio of its expected wage rates in the region and the 
nationwide average wage rate. 
Capital 
The change in the supply of capital to the RSA compared to its initial level also depends on the ratio ofthe 
return to capital in the region and the RSA. The nationwide return to capital is an average of the regions’ 
returns weighted by their demand for capital. 
The aggregate supply of capital is distributed among regions through a constant elasticity of 
transformation. The supply of capital from the RSA to the region is also related to the region’s return to 
capital and the nationwide average return to capital. 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
The IMAGE model accounts for three spheres of government: national, regional, and local. Each of these 
spheres of government is assigned certain powers, functions, and financial resources, each of which in 
turn may be exclusive, concurrent, or shared. Although the national government raises the vast majority 
of aggregate revenues, its expenditure responsibilities are much lower. There is thus a mismatch between 
revenues raised and expenditure responsibilities. A converse mismatch exists at the provincial level. This 
mismatch is known as vertical fiscal imbalance. Horizontal fiscal imbalance exists among regions, and 
also among localities within regions where different regions have different abilities to raise funds. Thus, 
there are massive relative differences among regions’ expenditure responsibilities and existing (as well as 
potential) revenue sources.  
Each government sphere spends on providing public services, subsidizing the national economy 
(activities and products), and transferring revenues to other governments and institutions. The IGRT are 
modeled in a standard fashion, that is, they are assumed fixed in real terms. Government fiscal policies 
also follow the standard specification; the national government expenses in a given region are exogenous. 
While national government fiscal balance is endogenously determined in all regions, its overall balance is 
exogenous. Therefore, a revenue-neutral hypothesis is assumed for the national government, and its 
revenue loss, if any, is compensated by an endogenous uniform tax on household gross incomes across all 
regions. Rigidity in expenses and revenue-neutral assumptions are also assumed for regional and local 
governments. Compensatory taxes at endogenous uniform rates are applied to households’ gross incomes. 
Interregional Private Transfers and Other Specificities 
The study uses a standard formulation in modeling private transfers, that is, they are fixed among regions 
as well as between a given region and the rest of the world. The assumptions associated with the rest of 
the model are discussed below. 
Regional Supply and Demand 
Producers maximize their profit under a given technology and prices. Industry-specific producers are 
modeled as representative producers that are assumed to have a nested constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) production technology. In addition, there is a separation between production activities and  
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commodities. A fixed proportional relationship between activity output and the domestic supply of 
commodities permits any activity to produce one or multiple commodities and any commodity to be 
produced by one or multiple activities.  
Consumers’ behavior is rational, which implies that in the presence of complete markets, there is 
a separation between their production and consumption decisions. With the fixed factor endowments 
assumption, their incomes are closely related to the return to these factors. Consumers maximize their 
utility under limited budgets and given market prices. In addition, households are modeled as 
representative agents that are assumed to have Stone-Geary types of preferences. 
Institutional Constraints 
AGE models differ primarily in the choices of closure rules that equilibrate commodity, factor, and 
foreign exchange markets. These models also differ in the rules specified to reconcile the government 
budget constraint and in the mechanism used to equilibrate savings and investment levels in the economy. 
The labor market is assumed to be fully segmented. Each category of labor is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile across industries. Skilled workers are fully employed in the economy, although low rates 
of frictional unemployment
5 are observed. The skilled labor market is assumed to be perfectly 
competitive, so that the prevailing wage rates equalize exogenous supply and endogenous demand for 
high-skilled workers. In contrast, there is imperfect competition in the unskilled labor markets, where the 
total demand does not equal the total supply. There is an excess supply of labor, which remains 
unemployed. The wage rate paid to unskilled workers is closely related to the unemployment rates 
through a wage curve specification. 
Institutional units are endowed with one type of capital, which is mobile among industries with 
one return to capital in the economy. The analysis is performed in a static comparative, which does not 
imply capital accumulation and investment rules. As a consequence, we assume exogenous investment 
and capital supply. Therefore, saving is investment driven. Savings are generated by exogenous constant 
rates for households and by residual savings for firms. Savings of the national, provincial, and local 
governments are exogenous, as are savings of the RSA and the rest of the world. 
Although every region exchanges directly with the rest of the world through the trade of goods 
and services and other transfers, the external current account balance is specified at the national level. 
The nationwide balance of the external current account is exogenous. Thus, an endogenous exchange rate 
or the relative price of goods and services traded with the rest of the world clears the external current 
account.  
However, regional submodels also feature external current accounts with the RSA. To avoid free 
lunches among regions, the balances of the external current accounts with the RSA are fixed; they are 
balanced through adjustments in region-specific exchange rates. The latter, defined as the relative price of 
goods and services traded with the RSA, are set as numeraires.  
                                                      
5 Frictional unemployment exists because both jobs and workers are heterogeneous. A mismatch related to skills, payment, 
working time, location, attitude, and tastes can result between the supply of and demand for labor.  
9 
3.  THE DATA 
The IMAGE model is operationalized through the calibration procedure, which consists of finding 
parameters that permit equations to exactly reproduce the benchmark situation given by nine region-level 
SAMs.
6 The structure and analysis of the regional SAMs are presented next. 
Regional Social Accounting Matrixes 
Regional SAMs are available for the nine regions that constitute South Africa. All SAMs are for the year 
2006 and are structured to include the following (see Table A.1 in the appendix): 
•  35 to 47 accounts for activities/commodities 
•  44 accounts for labor payments divided into 4 population groups and 11 occupations 
•  4 accounts for capital payments or the gross operating surplus (GOS) 
•  4 accounts for enterprises 
•  48 accounts for households, disaggregated into 4 population groups and 12 consumption deciles 
•  7 accounts for government income sources and 6 accounts for its expenditure items 
•  2 accounts for government capital accumulation and corporation and household capital 
accumulation 
•  4 accounts for the rest of South Africa 
•  5 accounts for the rest of the world 
•  1 account for residuals and discrepancies 
The adjustment procedure aims to set up a common framework for the nine regional SAMs, as 
well as being consistent with the standard structure of AGE models: 
•  Activities and products are aggregated into a suitable number of accounts according to the 
mapping made among the 9 regional SAMs in order to generate a uniform framework with 35 
industries/commodities, detailed as follows: 1 agriculture, 1 mining, 4 food, 1 beverage, 19 
manufacturing, and 9 services. 
•  The 44 accounts for labor payments are aggregated into the 11 occupational groups. 
•  The 4 accounts for enterprises are grouped into 2 categories: “Public Enterprise” and “Private 
Business Enterprise,” the latter including “Combi-Taxi Enterprise” and “Informal Enterprise.” 
•  The 48 accounts for households are aggregated according to the 12 consumption deciles. 
•  Income and expense accounts of the three levels of government—national, provincial, and 
local—are adjusted to match receipts (row) and spending (column). 
•  The 4 accounts for the rest of South Africa are aggregated into one account. 
•  The 5 accounts for the rest of the world are also aggregated into one account. 
•  Institutional accumulation accounts are aggregated into one account.  
•  The allowance for depreciation or payments of capital recorded directly in the capital account is 
first transferred to institutional units and then channeled to the capital account; the model follows 
the principle that saving is made by institutional units, either resident or nonresident. 
•  Residual accounts are cancelled out by combining them into the change in inventories featured in 
the accumulation account.  
                                                      
6 The SAMs are provided by the South African Department of Trade and Industry and were constructed by Coningharth 
Economists in 2008.  
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Other Data 
Alongside the SAM data, the calibration procedure of the IMAGE model requires additional 
information—essentially the elasticities, the Frisch parameter, and the unemployment rates. With the 
exception of unemployment rates, which are different from one region to another (Figure A.1 in the 
appendix), the value of parameters chosen for regional submodels are identical. 
The values of the income elasticity of demand are drawn from the work done by the Economic 
Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture for 114 countries (Table A.2 in the appendix).
7 
The elasticity of wage rates with respect to the unemployment rate is set at -0.1, according to estimates by 
Kingdon and Knight (2005). The value of -3.34 is chosen for the Frisch parameter, an estimate for 
middle-income countries by Hertel, McDougall, and Dimaranun (1997). The elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor is fixed at 2.5, the highest value surveyed by Annabi, Decaluwé and Cockburn 
(2006). The trade elasticities are estimated by Gibson (2003) for the Armington elasticities (Table A.3 in 
the appendix), and by Behar and Edwards (2004) for the export elasticities. The latter take the values of 
1.3 for the transformation elasticity and 6.0 for the export demand elasticity. 
The next set of parameters related to the interregional relationship is (1) the import and export 
elasticities, (2) the elasticity of factor mobility among regions with respect to prices, and (3) the 
transformation elasticity of factors among regions. As long as we do not have estimates for these 
parameters and the results of this analysis are likely to be influenced by their values, then the main 
simulation is carried out under two scenarios: low and high interregional relationships. These are 
discussed in depth in the following section.  
                                                      
7 The data are available at www.ers.usda.gov/data/internationalfooddemand. The values estimated for Botswana are used for 
South Africa because this database does not cover the latter country. South Africa and Botswana are comparable countries 
according to the Human Development Indexes annually computed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).   
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4.  SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
The IMAGE model developed for South Africa is used to assess the effectiveness of the current IGRT. 
The degree to which the national government’s equity goal is achieved through the current IGRT is 
quantified. Our simulation is based on the vertical imbalance of national government revenues and 
expenses among regions. 
We first present the revenues and expenses of the national government in each region to better 
understand the simulation performed later. Figure 4.1 shows the disparities between collected revenues 
and expenses by the national government in all regions. 
Figure 4.1—National government spending-to-income ratio by region (%) 
 
Source: Regional Social Accounting Matrixes for 2006. 
Limpopo and Eastern Cape are, by far, the regions that receive the greatest net transfers from the 
national government: for every R100 collected in the region, the national government spends R174 and 
R124, respectively. KwaZulu-Natal and North West Province are the two other regions that receive net 
transfers from the national government, but to a lesser extent: R103 and R102 for every R100 collected, 
respectively. 
In contrast, national government spending is less than the collected revenues in Mpumalanga, 
Free State, and Gauteng: it spends R81, R83, and R86 for every R100 collected, respectively. Northern 
Cape and Western Cape receive R91 and R92 for every R100 collected in these regions. 
To analyze the effectiveness of the IGRT in South Africa, we arbitrarily reduce by 50 percent the 
fiscal transfers under the current system. The effectiveness of the policy is captured through welfare 
effects measure by the changes in equivalent variation.
8 
It is assumed that the national government’s primary saving rate is identical for all regions, so we 
avoid simulating the national government fiscal balance alongside our main simulation scenario, the 
IGRT. Once national government fiscal balances are determined for all regions, we estimate the excess or 
deficit in spending if all collected revenues by the national government in the region are spent in the 
                                                      
8 Our experiment is limited to a 50 percent reduction of the IGRT because higher shocks, in particular a full cancelling out 
(100 percent), are too big for many regions (for example, Limpopo) and technically impossible to perform using the model. A 
progressive reduction of the IGRT simulated through a dynamic framework would be more appropriate in this case.  
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region. The excess/deficit in spending is then calculated in proportion to the initial national government 
spending in terms of transferred revenues to the region. In the baseline scenario, this excess/deficit in 
spending is nil. In the simulation scenario, it is assumed that 50 percent of the excess in spending is 
cancelled out for some regions and 50 percent of the deficit in spending is transferred back to other 
regions. 
Limpopo, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and North West Province receive less transfer revenues 
when 50 percent of the IGRT is cancelled out, and consequently national government spending falls in 
these regions. In contrast, Northern Cape, Western Cape, Free State, Mpumalanga, and Gauteng have 
additional fiscal spare, that is, national government spending increases in these regions. 
National government fiscal policy is not affected by the changes in transfer revenues, as it is 
retransferring revenues among regions. However, regional government fiscal policy is directly affected by 
the changes in transfer revenues. We adopt a revenue-neutral hypothesis for regional governments so that 
with fixed regional expenses and savings, the regional government budget is balanced through a 
compensatory tax or subsidy on households’ gross income. 
The 50 percent reductions of grants are performed under two scenarios: low and high 
interregional trade and factor mobility. The low interregional relationship scenario assumes that 
interregional trade elasticities are identical to international trade elasticities. Assuming no changes in 
regions’ ownership of factors and consequently temporary mobility of labor, we assume an inelastic 
interregional supply of labor and capital with respect to the changes in their relative regional prices. 
While the elasticity value of 0.1 is set for labor, a relatively more flexible value of 0.3 is chosen for 
capital. An identical elasticity value for labor mobility and the transformation elasticity is assumed, that 
is, after the decision to supply more or less labor to the other regions is made, the choice of the destination 
is still limited because of the hypothesis of temporary mobility of labor. However, it is assumed that the 
choice of the destination (the transformation elasticity) of capital is twice as flexible as the supply 
elasticity. As long as the openness of the regional economy is greater than that of the country economy, 
results drawn from the low scenario should be interpreted as lower bound results. Therefore, the high 
interregional relationship scenario measures the sensitivity of the results to higher economic interaction 
among regions. In this regard, the elasticities are set at values three times higher than their counterpart in 
the low scenario. The next section presents the results of the simulation under the two scenarios of 
interregional economic interactions.  
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5.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
The simulation demonstrates that reducing the current IGRT has significant interregional equity effects, 
although the overall impact is less important. Nationwide welfare falls by 0.6 percent when the IGRT is 
cut by 50 percent (Figure 5.1). However, its distributional effect among regions is important. Changes in 
welfare are negative in four regions: Limpopo (42–43 percent), Eastern Cape (24–30 percent), KwaZulu-
Natal (3–4 percent), and the North West Province (2 percent). As net receivers of IGTR, the regions 
witness a loss of revenues after a 50 percent cut in this transfer. 
As depicted in Figure 5.1, changes in welfare are positive in five regions: Mpumalanga (15 
percent), the Northern Cape (14–15 percent), Free State (11–12 percent), Gauteng (5–8 percent), and the 
Western Cape (5–7 percent). These positive changes in welfare are imputed to the additional revenues 
spent in these regions following the partial cancelling of revenue transfers initially destined for other 
regions. 
Theil indices are used to measure the regional disparities. The overall regional disparity increases 
by 5 to 6 percent (Figure 5.2). This is essentially imputed to the 16 to 17 percent increase in disparities 
between regions. 
Figure 5.1—Equivalent variation of initial consumption expenses (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 5.2—Variation in Theil indices (%) 
. 










Although the overall intra-regional disparities remain unchanged (Figure 5.2), the inter-regional 
disparities are important and vary from one region to another. Disparities between top and bottom income 
categories increase in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, regions initially receiving net positive IGRT 
(Tables 5.1 and 5.2). The reduction in revenue transferred to other regions—consequently, an increase in 
national government spending in the region—benefits the bottom income groups in the Northern Cape, 
Mpumalanga, and Free State. 
Table 5.1—Percent change in EV of initial consumption expenses: Low scenario 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: EV = equivalent variation. 



















P1  -22.1  10.4  8.0  -2.7  -40.8  15.0  13.2  -1.9  5.0 
P2  -20.3  10.4  7.0  -2.9  -37.9  12.4  11.4  -2.2  4.4 
P3  -20.8  10.5  6.8  -2.9  -38.4  12.4  11.3  -2.0  4.6 
P4  -20.7  10.5  6.6  -2.9  -38.8  12.7  10.2  -2.0  4.7 
P5  -20.9  10.5  6.8  -3.0  -38.3  12.7  9.8  -2.1  4.6 
P6  -21.4  10.7  6.7  -3.0  -39.3  13.1  9.2  -2.0  4.6 
P7  -22.3  10.7  6.9  -3.0  -40.6  12.6  9.5  -2.2  4.6 
P8  -22.8  10.8  6.8  -3.1  -41.0  13.1  15.8  -2.1  4.7 
P9  -23.0  11.0  6.7  -3.0  -42.6  13.8  15.1  -2.0  4.9 
P10  -28.9  12.3  7.6  -3.3  -52.1  17.5  13.2  -1.9  5.1 
P11  -33.7  13.1  9.3  -3.3  -50.1  17.4  17.7  -2.3  5.3 
P12  -25.0  14.4  8.1  -3.1  -43.0  15.0  58.7  -2.0  5.5 
ALL  -24.2  11.9  7.6  -3.1  -42.6  14.5  15.1  -2.1  5.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: EV = equivalent variation. 
Therefore, halving the IGRT in South Africa would lead to an increase of regional disparities. 
Regions such as Limpopo and Eastern Cape witness significant welfare losses compared to other regions. 
In the same vein, low-income households are heavily hit compared to the middle- and high-income 
households within these regions. Regions that were initially transferring revenue witness welfare gains, 



















P1  -27.2  9.8  5.9  -3.4  -39.8  14.4  10.8  -2.3  6.3 
P2  -26.0  9.8  5.6  -3.8  -36.6  12.5  8.7  -2.5  6.0 
P3  -26.6  9.9  5.2  -3.7  -37.3  12.9  8.4  -2.2  6.3 
P4  -26.3  9.9  4.8  -3.6  -37.8  13.1  9.3  -2.2  6.6 
P5  -26.5  9.8  5.1  -3.7  -36.8  12.9  9.0  -2.3  6.4 
P6  -26.7  10.0  4.8  -3.6  -38.2  13.4  9.9  -2.2  6.3 
P7  -27.8  10.0  5.3  -3.4  -39.4  12.7  10.9  -2.3  6.2 
P8  -27.9  10.1  4.8  -3.5  -40.0  13.1  16.2  -2.3  6.5 
P9  -28.1  10.4  4.4  -3.4  -41.6  14.2  15.1  -1.9  6.9 
P10  -35.4  11.6  4.5  -3.7  -51.7  17.9  13.8  -1.8  7.0 
P11  -41.9  12.4  6.9  -3.9  -49.8  17.3  18.5  -2.5  7.2 
P12  -31.5  13.9  5.2  -3.7  -42.2  15.4  54.8  -1.9  7.4 
ALL  -30.4  11.3  5.1  -3.7  -41.7  14.8  14.3  -2.1  7.0  
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The overall GDP effect is small; indeed, reducing the IGRT by 50 percent leads to a GDP 
decrease of 0.2 percent in the low scenario and 0.1 percent in the high scenario. Higher regional 
integration lowers the adverse effect of reducing the IGRT. However, the regional disparities are more 
important (Figure 5.3). The group of regions receiving revenues within the IGRT system witness a drop 
in GDP; the decrease is particularly significant in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape. GDP falls slightly in 
KwaZulu-Natal and the North West Province. Regions transferring revenues (Northern Cape, 
Mpumalanga, Free State, Gauteng, and Western Cape) see their GDPs increase with 50 percent less 
transfer payments.  
Figure 5.3—Change in gross domestic product (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
IGRT have income and price effects in all regions. Reducing the national government transfer 
payments leads to a drop in income in regions receiving transfer revenue, with negative effects on 
households’ well-being. Regions initially transferring revenues see their income and welfare increase. 
However, higher income increases the demand for goods and services and also increases the pressure on 
prices, which reduces the purchasing power and households’ well-being. 
In the following sections, to better understand the inter- and intraregional disparities, we explore 
the income and price effects. Assuming a revenue-neutral hypothesis for all governments, that is, fixed 
spending and savings, changes in revenue are captured through a compensatory tax or subsidy on 
households’ gross incomes and, consequently, their consumption. 
The reduction of IGRT by 50 percent creates a revenue deficit for regional governments in 
Limpopo, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and the North West Province. Therefore, these governments are 
in a situation in which they must reduce their expenses and/or increase their income. Assuming that 
expenditures are fixed, the alternative is that government increases taxes. This is done through an 
introduction of a uniform compensatory tax on households’ gross income. The additional tax rates 
required to fully compensate the loss of regional government revenue are 12.4 percent in Limpopo, 6.8 
percent in the Eastern Cape, 0.9 percent in KwaZulu-Natal, and 0.5 percent in the North West Province. 
In contrast, regions that are initially transferring revenues show compensatory subsidy rates of 4.1 
percent in the Northern Cape, 3.7 percent in Mpumalanga, 3.2 percent in Free State, 2.5 percent in 
Gauteng, and 1.7 percent in the Western Cape. 
Households’ gross incomes fall in the low and high trade and factor mobility scenarios (Tables 
5.3 and 5.4). Income decreases in the initially net receiver regions because of the transfer cut and the 
ensuing positive compensatory tax rates. It declines in the initially net payer regions because of the 
inflationary and depreciatory effects; consequently, domestic factor and commodity prices fall relative to  
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external prices. Consumer price indexes also fall, and, consequently, real consumption increases for the 
net payers and decreases for the net receivers. 
Because of the regressive nature of the compensatory tax, and eventually public expenses when 
government must cut its expenses instead of increasing taxes, poor households are hit hard in regions 
where its rate increases. In contrast, poor households benefit more in regions where the compensatory tax 
rate falls. 
Table 5.3—Percent change in revenue: Low scenario 
   Eastern 
Cape 
Free 













Gross income  -4.3  -3.6  -2.9  -3.7  -3.2  -3.7  -3.1  -3.6  -3.5 
Compensatory tax rate  6.8  -3.2  -2.5  0.9  12.4  -3.7  -4.1  0.5  -1.7 
Disposable income  -12.3  -0.2  -0.2  -4.8  -16.6  0.3  2.5  -4.4  -1.6 
Consumer price index  -4.5  -3.3  -1.6  -3.7  -3.9  -3.8  -1.7  -3.6  -3.5 
Real consumption  -8.3  4.0  1.4  -1.1  -13.2  4.4  16.0  -0.8  2.1 
Source: Simulation results. 
Table 5.4—Percent change in revenues: High scenario 
   Eastern 
Cape 
Free 













Gross income  -1.3  -0.8  -0.6  -1.0  -0.7  -1.3  -1.2  -1.2  -0.9 
Compensatory tax rate  6.2  -3.2  -2.4  0.8  11.9  -4.0  -4.4  0.4  -1.3 
Disposal income  -8.6  2.8  2.1  -1.9  -13.8  3.2  5.2  -1.7  0.6 
Consumer price index  -1.4  -0.8  -0.2  -1.0  -1.2  -1.1  0.6  -1.0  -0.9 
Real consumption  -7.5  4.3  2.4  -0.9  -12.9  4.5  17.8  -0.6  1.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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6.  CONCLUSION 
Previous studies of fiscal consolidation attempts have tended to focus solely on general government; this 
paper, in contrast, has established an important role for subnational government in fiscal consolidation. 
Using a multiregion AGE model, we have provided a picture of how efficiency and equity goals are 
affected. Although the results that emerge from our empirical analysis are varied, it is worth highlighting 
two general points.  
First, we demonstrate that cuts in grants have significant interregional equity effects although the 
overall impact is less important. Reducing the current intergovernmental transfers leads to a decrease in 
welfare in regions initially receiving revenues, that is, Limpopo, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and the 
North West Province. However, welfare increases in regions that were initially transferring revenues, that 
is, Northern Cape, Mpumalanga, Free State, Gauteng, and the Western Cape. The change in GDP is also 
negative for the former group of regions, while it is positive for the latter ones. 
Second, cuts in grants also have significant intraregional equity effects, although the 
economywide effect is small. When transfer revenues fall and, consequently, regional and local 
government revenues decrease, poor households are the most affected, as they depend more on public 
services, which are essentially financed by governments. When the government fiscal position improves, 
it is also poor households that benefit more from additional government expenses. Cuts in grants can be 
compensated by increases in taxation. However, the effect of an increase in subnational taxation is that 
households’ incomes drop and income disparity widens. Because of the regressive nature of the integrated 
compensatory tax—and eventually public expenses when the government has to cut its expenses instead 
of increasing taxes—poor households are hit hard in regions where the tax rate increases. In contrast, poor 
households benefit more in regions where the compensatory tax rate falls. 
This analysis represents a modest first step toward more complete empirical assessment of fiscal 
consolidation in economies with multispherical governments. A number of extensions can be performed 
with the current model. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers may also have dynamic efficiency gains in the 
sense that if higher spending on services such as education, health, transportation, water, sanitation, and 
public housing increase the stock of human capital, then this might increase the rate of economic growth 
and per capita incomes. It is essential to extend the model to capture these dynamic interactions. The 
work can also be extended to explore many other issues, such as the impact of the equitable formula on 
national and subnational performance; the effects of varying the equitable formula to regions, that is, a 
move from population-based to needs-based formula using the poverty status of regions; the effects of 
matching grants versus block grants; the effects of conditional grants, considering the conditional grants 
by sector or by classification; the effects of targeted use of transfers versus nontargeted use; the effects of 
revenue raising at the provincial level, that is, reducing the national income tax and using that fiscal space 
for provincial personal income taxes; the effects of changing the component shares of conditional grants 
per province; and the effects of various funding possibilities for raising revenue for regional public goods, 
revenue-neutral financing, redistributive taxes, and uniform tax deductions. Despite all these deficiencies, 
we find the results to be quite thought-provoking, as it is clear that the design of fiscal consolidation 
programs requires a careful balance between intergovernmental and interregional fairness.  
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table A.1—Dimension of the regional Social Accounting Matrix 
SAMs accounts  Eastern 
Cape 
Free 













Activity  42  36  37  45  46  47  37  35  47 
Commodity  42  36  37  45  46  47  37  35  47 
Labor  44  44  44  44  44  44  44  44  44 
Capital  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Enterprise  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Household  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48 
Govt income (expenses)  7 (6)  7 (6)  7 (6)  7 (6)  7 (6)  7 (6)  7 (6)  7 (6)  7 (6) 
Capital account  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Rest of South Africa  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Rest of the world  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
Discrepancy  1  1  -  1  1  1  1  1  - 
Source: Regional Social Accounting Matrixes for 2006. 
Table A.2—Income elasticity of consumption products 
Products  Value  Products  Value 
Agriculture  0.655  Other fabricated metal products  1.367 
Mining  1.367  Machinery and equipment  1.367 
Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils, and fat 
products  0.697  Electrical machinery and apparatus  1.367 
Dairy products  0.764  Communication, medical, and other 
electronic equipment   1.367 
Grain mill, bakery, and animal feed products  0.458  Manufacturing of transport equipment  1.367 
Other food products  0.697  Other manufacturing and recycling  1.367 
Beverages and tobacco products  0.989  Electricity  1.208 
Textiles, clothing, leather products, and footwear  0.917  Water  1.208 
Wood and wood products  1.367  Building and construction  1.367 
Furniture  1.204  Trade  1.367 
Paper and paper products  1.367  Accommodation  1.208 
Publishing and printing  1.367  Transport  1.221 
Chemicals and chemical products (including 
plastic products)  1.208  Communication  1.221 
Rubber products  1.367  Insurance  1.367 
Nonmetallic mineral products  1.367  Real estate  1.208 
Basic metal products  1.367  Business services  1.514 
Structural metal products  1.367  Community, social, and personal 
services  1.367 
Source: Regmi and Seale (2010).  
Note: Data are the 1996 International Comparison Program (ICP) data for Botswana. 
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Table A.3—Armington elasticities 
Products  Value  Products  Value 
Agriculture  1.273  Other fabricated metal products  0.747 
Mining  2.771  Machinery and equipment  0.490 
Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils, and fat 
products  0.937  Electrical machinery and apparatus  0.944 
Dairy products  0.937 
Communication, medical, and other 
electronic equipment   0.505 
Grain mill, bakery, and animal feed products  0.937  Manufacturing of transport equipment  0.786 
Other food products  0.937  Other manufacturing and recycling  0.417 
Beverages and tobacco products  1.570  Electricity  1.437 
Textiles, clothing, leather products, and footwear  2.040  Water  1.437 
Wood and wood products  1.205  Building and construction  1.280 
Furniture  1.075  Trade  0.603 
Paper and paper products  0.789  Accommodation  0.420 
Publishing and printing  0.200  Transport  0.861 
Chemicals and chemical products (including 
plastic products)  0.730  Communication  0.568 
Rubber products  1.135  Insurance  0.616 
Nonmetallic mineral products  0.942  Real estate  1.066 
Basic metal products  0.447  Business services  1.066 
Structural metal products  0.747 
Community, social, and personal 
services  1.065 
Source: Gibson (2003). 
Figure A.1—Unemployment rates by province (%) 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa (2009).   
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